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Abstract 
This article proposes a new approach to assessing evidence during a systematic 
evidence review aiming to inform international development policy. Drawing lessons 
from a number of social science systematic evidence reviews, the paper identifies 
how the method’s limiting perspective on evidence (including the exclusive focus on 
‘golden standard’ empirical information) has serious disadvantages for the usability of 
evidence reviews for policy. This article aims to provide an alternative framework 
that allows for a less exclusionary, yet policy-practical way of assessing evidence. We 
propose four perspectives on evidence, appropriate for different stages in the policy 
process: principle when setting or prioritising broad policy goals, plausibility when 
assessing specific future policies, proof when evaluating past policies and possibility 
when striving for innovation and allowing exchange of ideas. 
Keywords:  policy, systematic evidence review, proof, plausibility, principle, 
possibility 
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1 Introduction 
Does international development policy want to play it safe? An emerging trend to 
base policy decisions solely on evidence of what works gives that impression. A 
renewed emphasis on measuring success and failure in policy and development 
programming, as well as a drive to make development aid cost-efficient, has elevated 
‘evidence’ to a development policy kingmaker. Donors assume that basing policy 
decisions on evidence “increases the success of policies, their value for money and 
their impact” (Gasteen, 2010: 1).  
The pursuit of ‘evidence’ in policy-making has also shown that there are no clearly 
signposted roads for a policy-maker to follow when hunting down ‘evidence’. 
Indeed, often it is not clear what ‘evidence’ looks like, so the search warrant has no 
description or picture of what needs to be found. In other words, although vast 
amounts of information and knowledge exist about development programmatic 
approaches that fail or succeed, including whether failure and success is the same for 
those implementing a policy and those at the receiving end of it–such knowledge is 
often not systematically accessible, usable or appropriate. 
Evidence-based policies require two things that are surprisingly difficult to come by:  
solid and appropriate information as well as solid systems to administer, assess, and 
disseminate such information. Our experience with conducting a number of 
systematic evidence reviews in international development–which forms the backbone 
of this article–has taught us that these solid systems are not in place. Even if 
information is easily accessible, researchers, policy-makers and practitioners will 
inevitably return to the question of what kind of information constitutes ‘evidence’ 
and how to interpret this ‘evidence’ for a policy. Systematic ‘evidence’ reviewing is 
one answer to this question. We learned that this solution has a number of 
disadvantages: by defining ‘evidence’ as exclusively empirical information, theoretical 
knowledge and with that often seminal work is excluded while innovation is 
potentially inhibited. More importantly, it is not clear how one moves from finding 
‘evidence’ in a systematic review to making it usable for policy decisions. What is 
needed is a way of framing the pathway of moving from reviewing the state of the 
evidence to assessing its contribution in a less exclusionary way that allows a hands-
on debate regarding the role particular evidence might play in the formulation of 
policies. What we propose in this article is a less exclusionary framework for this 
process that is simple and practical without dismissing how complicated it is to agree 
on what constitutes evidence. The framework encourages scepticism, but in a 
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constructive way. We see this scepticism as crucial, after all the emphasis on evidence 
stems from the belief that “clean, clear information” will be the main driver of 
change in the future (White and Waddington, 2012: 351). One problem is, however, 
that in systematic evidence reviews, the evaluation criteria are exclusively focussed on 
assessing the quality of evidence based on a very limiting set of quality criteria.  
With this article, we propose a different approach to assessing evidence in systematic 
evidence reviews: Rather than looking at the quality through often dubious criteria, 
we propose to use systematic evidence reviews to assess evidence according to its 
usability.  
Yet the quest for this information obscures that the word ‘evidence’ is an umbrella 
term, that describes a broad category; only with further specification does the notion 
become meaningful in the process of systematically reviewing evidence. Speaking 
about ‘evidence’ in this context is like speaking about ‘countries’ whereas in fact it 
makes a big difference if you are talking about Bhutan, Brazil or Scotland. Thus 
rather than use the word ‘evidence’ to pretend it describes something specific, we 
propose four distinct interpretations of evidence when systematically assessing it: 
Proof, plausibility, principle and possibility. The second part of the article describes 
in detail what we mean by these. Each of these sub-categories of evidence warrants 
to be included in a systematic evidence review, yet when it comes to translating the 
findings from an evidence review into policy thinking, each sub-category is 
appropriate for a different policy process. Having established this new vocabulary, 
we are going to discard the inverted commas around ‘evidence’ as the word now 
serves only to describe a broader phenomenon, rather than being implicitly imbued 
with different meanings.  
In giving you a framework for a less exclusionary approach to assessing evidence in a 
systematic review and for clarifying its applicability for specific policy purposes–i.e. 
for moving from talking about countries to talking about Bhutan or Brazil–we pay 
special attention to how and when evidence falling short of the “gold standard” 
could be used in policy-making. This gold standard, referenced by the UK 
Department for International Development (DfiD), refers to experimental research 
that seeks “to demonstrate cause and effect relationships...because they construct a 
‘counterfactual’, experimental studies significantly reduce the risks of important 
biases affecting the findings of research” (Department for International 
Development, 2014: 7). Since this gold standard is not always achievable–nor its 
categorisation as gold unchallenged–we aim to identify ways of recognising situations 
when the drive for evidence-based policy is unproductive. The remainder of this 
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article will thus tackle a few questions: What are the shortcomings of systematic 
evidence reviews in the social sciences? When systematically reviewing evidence in 
international development, what information constitutes what kind of evidence? 
How can this evidence be assessed in a less exclusionary way when probed for its 
policy relevance?  
1.1 In a systematic evidence review, what is evidence? 
Systematic evidence reviews are a somewhat new phenomenon in international 
development, maybe also because, as White and Waddington (2012) argue, “the 
evidence bar has been rather low, with many policies based on anecdote and ‘cherry 
picking’ of favourable cases” (White and Waddington, 2012: 351). Systematic 
evidence reviews are meant to counter cherry picking by investigating all the 
information that is out there in a uniform way. This is meant to separate poor quality 
evidence from good quality, akin to an archaeological pursuit during which lots of 
stuff is dug up but the decision of what constitutes a valuable shard worth preserving 
as opposed to a piece of junk is made with a specialist set of criteria. Systematic 
evidence reviews are after empirical evidence of a certain kind: DfiD lists “primary 
experimental”, “quasi-experimental”, “observational” as acceptable types of 
evidence.(Department for International Development, 2014: 9)  
This is a narrow definition of evidence, which is problematic in itself. Further, it 
overlooks that not all empirical observations are equally convincing even to those 
who operate with narrow definitions of evidence. Various scales exist to demarcate 
the information hierarchy, delineating where a particular piece of information stands 
within this hierarchy. The peak of the hierarchy is the afore-mentioned ‘gold 
standard,’ meaning in DfiD’s definition that research designs ‘explicitly seek to 
demonstrate cause and effect relationships, and are able to do so with varying 
degrees of confidence. Because they construct a “counterfactual”, experimental 
studies significantly reduce the risks of important biases affecting the findings of 
research, and for this reason, they are often regarded as the ‘gold standard’ for 
research which aims to isolate cause and effect.’(Department for International 
Development, 2014: 7) 
 The Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods is one of the best-known ways of 
assessing this information hierarchy. To score three or higher on this five-point scale, 
a study must have a treatment and control group and must record outcomes in each 
group before and after execution of the policy under study. The authors regard this 
as the minimum standard for drawing conclusions about the success of a policy. A 
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study also including relevant control variables would get a score of four, whereas the 
highest score is reserved for studies where the policy is randomly assigned between 
treatment and control group (Farrington et al., 2002). This study design, a 
Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT), is also considered the ‘gold standard’ in 
research design (Castillo and Wagner, 2013). However, it is evident this standard is 
best suited to a particular type of research: quantitative research with policies that can 
be (ethically) randomised. Policies at the individual or community level, such as 
medical interventions (Miguel and Kremer, 2003), or interventions in schools (Paul et 
al., 2009) can be relatively easily randomised and have been the subjects of RCTs. 
Policies at a higher level, for example the global Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme to counter so-called conflict diamonds cannot be randomised easily and 
control groups may not exist. Consequently, evaluations of these policies have used 
methods that would score below three on the Maryland Scale (Grant and Taylor, 
2007). Finally, in order to place a study on the Maryland Scale, the study has to be 
transparent about the research methods used. As we will see in the next section, 
numerous studies are not.  
This perspective on evidence also overlooks some of the realities of evidence use. 
Despite gold standards, in the heat of searching for evidence to include in policy 
documentation the origin of information and how it was collected is often neglected. 
When it is convenient, someone else having said something supportive of a policy 
approach can quickly become evidence in the echo chamber–even if no systematic 
evidence review convincingly brought up evidence. Or, as Andreas and Greenhill 
(2010) illustrate, objective sounding statistics can be the result of a process in which 
erroneous numbers are repeated so often that they become fact (Andreas and 
Greenhill, 2010). Distinguishing between the sound ricocheting off the walls of the 
consensus mountains and empirical observations is not always easy.  
2 Lessons from systematically reviewing evidence  
Our starting point for thinking about these questions was a systematic evidence 
review–a mechanical assessment of information. The main donor of our research 
programme, the UK Department for International Development (DfID) required 
such a review, although it did not impose a specific method. The systematic evidence 
review was meant as a first step in designing the research agenda: reviewing all 
available evidence would expose areas where evidence was scant and gaps to be 
filled. The research programme conducted systematic evidence reviews on seven 
topics in the field of justice and security in conflict-affected areas using broadly the 
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same basic method (Carayannis et al., 2014; Cuvelier et al., 2013; Forsyth and 
Schomerus, 2013; Luckham and Kirk, 2012; Macdonald, 2013; Seckinelgin and Klot, 
2014). 
Detailed descriptions of methods, including where they varied, can be found in the 
individual papers. We largely followed general recommendations to pursue “a well-
defined question for the review, (2) an explicit search strategy, (3) clear criteria for 
the inclusion or exclusion of studies, (4) systematic coding and critical appraisal of 
included studies, and (5) a systematic synthesis of study findings, including meta-
analysis where (it is) appropriate.”(White and Waddington, 2012: 354) Suffice to say 
that each systematic review consisted of two steps. First, we systematically searched 
literature on the particular topic that met our criteria. Second, we systematically 
assessed the quality of all the works in this pool of literature. Implicitly, this involved 
making judgments on which information makes for better evidence. The outputs 
from this process were reports on the state of the evidence base in the seven selected 
areas.  
Online search tools and databases were our major source of information in the first 
step. These mainly included search engines geared towards searching academic 
literature, but also a few specializing in grey literature–that is literature that is not 
peer-reviewed and generally self-published by the organisation conducting the 
research. We entered an elaborate and standardized keyword string in each search 
engine. Search results were then filtered manually. Any studies containing empirical 
information at the individual level were added to the pool of literature, any studies 
not providing empirical information were discarded.  
In assessing the quality of research works in the pool, we used a number of criteria to 
judge the quality of the evidence presented in the studies found. These criteria were 
formulated differently for different studies employing different methods. Using this 
method we assessed more than 1000 articles for all seven systematic reviews 
combined.  
The importance of systematic evidence reviews for social sciences is steadily growing, 
indeed they have been called “one of the great ideas of modern thought”(White and 
Waddington, 2012: 351). It is generally assumed that reviewing information 
systematically “strengthen[s] the capacity to make evidence-informed decisions by 
providing rigorous and timely assessments of the evidence base to decision makers” 
and to “make it easier for policy makers and practitioners to develop evidence 
informed policy” (Department for International Development, 2013). Yet there are 
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many caveats to this assumed chain of events; a few of these caveats are the 
limitations to systematic evidence reviewing. These limitations might be specific to 
the topics we explored, but they could plausibly hold for the method in general as 
others have shown (Mallett et al., 2012).  
     
2.1 Lesson 1: Systematic evidence reviewing runs the risk of omitting 
seminal works 
We had anticipated that designing a systematic way to assess the quality of works of 
research would be difficult–it is difficult to agree on quality criteria with team 
members from different academic disciplines. We treated the first step of 
constructing the literature pool as a more technical exercise: make keywords, put 
them in search engines, sift through the results.  
It turned out that the most difficult part with the strongest influence on the 
outcomes was not assessing the quality of the studies, but finding them–which is 
important since including “all the available studies, including journals, grey literature 
and unpublished studies” (Gasteen, 2010: 1) is considered the cornerstone of 
systematic reviewing. Works that we considered seminal did not end up in the pool, 
even after using more than ten search engines and carefully constructed keywords. 
Frustratingly–and tellingly–a lot of our own work did not show up through the 
searches either. Colleagues whom we asked for feedback were often mystified by the 
absence of what they considered obvious references. In addition, we found very little 
relevant grey literature. Search engines alone were clearly no guarantee of finding “all 
available studies.” One group that used  ‘snow-ball searches’ and a separate inquiry 
amongst peers succeeded better at capturing all relevant literature; but at the cost of 
making the process less systematic. Further, by focussing only on publications a 
publication bias sets: since “null, and possibly negative, findings are less likely to be 
published”(Waddington et al., 2012: 362), we are less likely to ever hear about what 
could potentially be crucial findings. 
Why did the systematic review process miss so much? Maybe not all authors 
provided accurate and sufficient keywords. There are no universal repositories for 
working papers, ‘grey’ literature and papers that have not gone through the time-
consuming process of being published yet. It has been recognised that cataloguing 
research in international development is “less standardised amongst a wide array of 
role-players, with no equivalent of the large freely accessible health care library, 
PubMed.”(Stewart et al., 2012: 433-434) Further, in our systematic review process we 
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only included papers with individual-level empirical information that some papers, 
however seminal, may not contain.  
Yet more likely it is extremely difficult to impossible to capture certain fields of 
research in a set of keywords. This could be because different disciplines indicate the 
same subject with different keywords. For example, large amounts of literature exist 
on peacekeeping–indeed there is a journal primarily devoted to the topic1–but within 
economics or quantitatively oriented political science, one rarely finds the term. A 
leading review of the state of the literature in these fields (Blattman and Miquel, 
2009) tellingly only mentions the term ‘peacekeeping’ when it discusses efforts to 
integrate historical-political case studies and statistical methods.  
Fields of study and thus keywords may change over time. Truly seminal works may 
create entirely new fields of study, which are only later captured by keywords. 
Insights from these works may be taken beyond the context in which they were 
originally proposed. Charles Tilly for example is now often cited in studies on 
conflicts in Africa for his theory that war can build states, which was published under 
the title Coercion, Capital and European States: ad 990-1992. Its abstract does not 
mention the keywords ‘war’, ‘conflict’ or ‘violence’.    
 
2.2 Lesson 2: Restricting the definition of ‘evidence’ to ‘empirical 
information’ is truly limiting 
Many shortcomings of systematic evidence reviews are a consequence of defining 
evidence as exclusively empirical information, which is how DfID implicitly and 
sometimes explicitly defines it when speaking about making decisions based on 
“what we know” and how this increases “the success of policies, their value for 
money and their impact.” (Department for International Development, 2013) In the 
past, a prominent criticism of systematic evidence reviews has been their narrow 
focus on quantitative evidence (Snilstveit, 2012). While we specifically moved beyond 
that, we found that the criterion that a study had to contain empirical information at 
the individual level might be equally restrictive: It generally decimated the number of 
results from the search engines. The evidence paper on conflict resolution for 
                                                 
1 Journal of International Peacekeeping 
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example reports that from the 543 studies found by one search engine, only 63 
(12 %) were considered to include individual-level empirical information from 
reading the abstract. For another search engine, this was 60 out of 1635 (4 %), for 
another 56 out of 1060 (5 %). Typically, an additional third of the papers initially 
included because of their abstract did not include a meaningful amount of empirical 
information upon closer reading. 
Of course, our self-imposed inclusion criteria required studies to have individual-level 
empirical information, not empirical information in general. However, from our 
experience with the review process, a large percentage of publications in academia is 
non-empirical–or as Waddington argues, there is “a paucity of primary studies which 
are able credibly to address causality”(Waddington et al., 2012: 380)–and the number 
of empirical works is so small that this criterion ended up being interpreted very 
widely. Non-empirical works include purely theory-based work, opinion pieces or 
studies that are unclear about the information they use. Although defining only 
empirical research as evidence would appear sensible, discarding theoretical works 
for the purpose of a systematic evidence review must mean that some babies that 
ought to still be in the bath tub have also gone.  
An important realization is the following: if evidence is strictly defined as empirical 
information, and all policies have to be evidence-based, there can never be a new 
type of policy, strictly speaking. Empirical information by definition requires some 
real-world phenomenon to be studied, and if the policy has never existed it cannot 
have been. Although lines may not be so clearly drawn in reality, it is a realistic worry 
that the focus on evidence-based policy may decrease space for innovation.  
Theoretical work may be useful for policy making, especially when few empirical 
studies exist. If empirical evidence is not available, a policy that at least could work 
according to a sound theoretical framework would be preferable over one that is not 
supported or actively contradicted by theory. Unless we are willing to accept that no 
policy is possible in the absence of empirical observations, theory or principles can 
be relevant. The framework presented in this paper attempts to bring theory, and 
innovative or principled thought back into the so-called evidence-based policy 
process.  
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2.3 Lesson 3: Studies (especially in certain disciplines) often do not contain 
enough information on method to assess their quality 
Many of the criteria for assessing the quality of a study rely on the author describing 
his or her methods in some detail. However, we found that many studies, especially 
from the more qualitative disciplines, neglected to give the reader even basic 
methodological information–although Duvendack et al. report similar concerns 
about lack of information on design and analysis in quantitative work (Duvendack et 
al., 2012). In some cases information was presented as fact, or as stemming from the 
author’s research, without further explanation as to how this information was 
obtained and filtered by the author. It was also common for studies to mention in 
passing that they were based ‘on interviews’, but not on how many interviews, with 
whom, or where these were held and by whom. A number of studies that we knew to 
be based on sound methods (either from knowing the author or seeing him or her 
presenting the work in person) received very low scores on the quality assessments 
because they did not make the method transparent. From a policy-maker point of 
view, although it may be difficult to judge the quality of certain studies, this does not 
mean that these studies need to be automatically dismissed as non-evidence. 
Especially when studies about a particular topic are rare, it would appear to be a 
waste to omit this information from the policy process. Yet if researchers wish their 
work to be classified as high-quality evidence, they need to describe their methods 
and its shortcomings in detail.  
 
2.4 Lesson 4: The missing step: an assessment of the overall state of the 
‘evidence’ 
Systematic evidence reviewing does not necessarily provide a clear analytical path for 
moving from reviewing numerous individual studies to a general assessment of the 
state of the evidence (Hannes and Macaitis, 2012). We designed no systematic 
guidance on how this should be done, thus the process of moving from finding all 
relevant information and assessing its quality to assessing the quality of the evidence 
base as a whole remained a black box–a shortcoming in transparency that has also 
been noted by others (Snilstveit et al., 2012). Within the team, some authors had a 
tendency to disengage from the systematic legwork that had been done and in their 
writing drew on their own knowledge. This experience is not unique to us. 
“Synthesis” or the inability to do meta-analysis and draw meaningful conclusions 
from an evidence review–without being guided by pre-existing knowledge or 
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opinions–and difficulties in “[g]enerating useful policy recommendations” are two of 
the seven practical challenges of the systematic evidence review method mentioned 
in another review on systematic evidence reviews(ODI Secure Livelihoods Research 
Consortium, 2012).  
It is not the case that methods to synthesize results from different studies do not 
exist. However, these methods can only be applied to a very restricted set of 
systematic reviews. Meta-analysis is such a method to synthesize results from 
quantitative studies. It involves running a regression on the regression results 
obtained by the studies under review (Mekasha and Tarp, 2013). As such, it can only 
be applied if there is a substantial body of studies with the same outcome variable, 
the same explanatory variable and the same method. It is most frequently used in the 
medical field, where numerous studies investigate a single treatment for a single 
condition. It’s applications to the field of development, and especially to the topic of 
insecurity and injustice, are limited: even if it is possible to agree on the ‘condition’ to 
be treated (poverty, insecurity, lack of justice), potential ‘treatments’ are myriad and 
fast-changing and comparable studies scarce. 
A second approach to synthesizing is ‘narrative synthesis’. While no consensus exists 
as to what exactly a narrative synthesis is, this approach broadly summarises a given 
topic from many angles–thus giving a comprehensive narrative of the state of 
research–but without consideration of a statistical or systematically comprehensive 
summary of the state of evidence. Narrative syntheses tend to not strictly follow a 
methodical search for evidence; this means they are often not transparent about how 
decisions about relevance and strength of evidence were made (Collins, 2004: 102). 
However, more systematic variations of this approach can now also be found (for 
example (Greenhalgh et al., 2005) (Hannes and Macaitis, 2012)). Further, narrative 
synthesis has been found to be possibly most effective when used in conjunction 
with meta-analysis (Rodgers et al., 2009). Below we outline a particular case in which 
narrative synthesis might be the superior way of presenting a a review of the state of 
knowledge on a topic. 
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3 Thinking about systematically reviewing evidence for policy 
relevance in a different way 
Apart from learning more about the need for transparency, clever choice of 
keywords, the shortcomings of search engines and how difficult it is to write 
neutrally based on information presented, rather than in an opinionated way, we 
learned another crucial lesson. It is actually not clear how a systematic evidence 
review would automatically translate into a simple answer to what the state of the 
evidence implies for a particular policy. Although we made lots of interesting points 
in a substantial number of evidence reviews, we have so far not have had policy-
makers banging on our doors for more. Maybe that is because what we presented 
was just enough to draw on for some decisions–after all, it has been noted that policy 
makers need to make decisions, even if the evidence base on which to make those is 
limited (Snilstveit, 2012: 391). Or maybe we did not come up with a hands-on 
practical framing of how the kind of evidence we found might be relevant for policy 
thinking. Maybe we felt as if we were asked to simplify complex findings into 
information popcorn–fluffed up, making a bang and easy to eat. That however does 
not get us off the hook of providing a better understanding of the information that is 
out there. We concluded that doing systematic evidence reviews becomes a valuable 
exercise when we use it to think about the evidence we find in different ways. Sifting 
through large amounts of research just to see if individual level empirical material 
exists, or if RCTs have been conducted misses a broader point. A better way of 
treating systematic evidence reviews is to engage with the evidence found with the 
aim to get a better understanding of how a particular issue is researched, understood, 
thought about. It’s not popcorn but rather the somewhat laborious, messy, sweet and 
enjoyable consumption of corn-on-the-cob.  
We understand why this is hardly done. The corn-on-the-cob approach is missing 
because of the different claims researchers and policymakers want to make. In the 
words of Nancy Cartwright: researchers want to make “it works somewhere” claims, 
studying individual cases using methods geared to making sure that conclusions are 
valid for the case studied (internal validity)(Cartwright and Munro, 2010). Policy 
makers on the other hand, would like to make “it will work for us” claims, to base 
their decisions on (ODI, 2009: 2). 
These two modes of working seem irreconcilable–and yet we are proposing a 
method of translation to bridge this gap when conducting systematic evidence 
reviews. It starts from the realisation that the evidence debate among those in 
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research, policy, and practice could benefit from agreeing on certain terminology to 
describe what particular pieces of information are and are not doing. We are making 
a controversial proposal to use a research-sympathetic and policy-friendly framing of 
how to think about good evidence when faced with huge amounts of research on 
topic. Thinking practically about evidence in the way we propose here might allow 
for better categorisation of information, more honesty when dealing with 
information, and with that hopefully more transparency and better decision-making.  
Our suggestion is to systematically review evidence and assess its applicability for 
informing policy by dividing it into “The Four Ps”: Proof, plausibility, principle and 
possibility. Each of the Four P’s, we argue, is relevant in a different stage of policy 
thinking, thus systematic evidence reviews would be more useful if they divided their 
findings according to these categories: 
• When broad policy goals are already set or prioritized, we argue that an 
emphasis on searching for evidence in a systematic review is misplaced 
and propose principle.  
• When assessing different possible future policies to attain a specific 
broad goal, plausibility is the most relevant category in synthesizing 
existing evidence.  
• We see limited use for the notion of evidence as proof outside the 
evaluation of past policy–the idea that systematic evidence reviews will 
propose proof on a matter is unhelpful. 
• And when striving for innovation, we propose possibility, which is a 
category of evidence that tends to be discarded in systematic reviewing.  
In all these stages, we put emphasis on transparency about what a particular piece of 
information constitutes evidence for, and with what level of certainty.  
3.1 The Preferred P: Proof 
The UK’s Minister for International Development, Justine Greening, laid out her 
vision for her department’s future in her first major speech after her appointment. 
For her, international development supported by the UK means that UK aid money 
needs to be spend “in the right places, on the right things and done in the right 
way”(Greening, 2013). Establishing the clear distinction between something that is 
right and wrong implies bulletproof knowledge on what makes a plan, a time, and a 
place “right.” We name this approach to evidence proof: the notion that one can 
search for evidence that, once used, will guarantee future success. The notion of proof 
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before execution of a policy is unhelpful, not just because we learned from doing 
systematic reviews that the required information is difficult to come by or of low 
quality. It also assumes that policy information that can act as proof could possibly 
exist.  
This interpretation of evidence is reminiscent of what is used in a criminal court, 
where a piece of evidence is presented and once a judgement has been made on it, 
the evidence has become proof for the correctness of that judgement. How 
problematic the notion of proof is in situations when making decisions on policies to 
be implemented in the future is obvious. What proof-based policy is trying to do is 
to predict the future: because something is considered to have been proven in the 
past, it is expected of the research or practice community to deliver continued proof 
that it will work in the future. Yet, in the court for proof-based policy, the evidence 
stems from studying a different incarnation of this policy, at a different time, often in 
a different country. “‘Cutting out the noise’ probably misses the point in 
international development research (and the social sciences more broadly), where 
context is everything,” is how researchers at ODI have described this issue (ODI 
Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, 2012). If we can find a study including 
convincing evidence on Sri Lanka, can this be generalized to other contexts? A 
policy’s success in Sri Lanka does neither guarantee success in Sierra Leone, nor 
necessarily continued success in Sri Lanka itself. To stick to the court analogy: proof 
in one legal case, even gold standard proof, cannot be called upon to make the same 
point in another case with different actors, times, and places. The notion of 
exchangeability contradicts everything we know about context-awareness. Crucially 
from a research perspective, proof implies that a final verdict on a matter has been 
reached, rendering future research and learning–and maybe even development–
unnecessary. But there is no need to worry just yet: Even after conducting numerous 
systematic reviews, we ended up with the realization the search for proof-based 
evidence for future development policies mostly draws a blank.  
The notion of evidence as proof crowds out the space for flexibility and 
responsiveness. These two things are crucial in development and difficult to 
underpin with information. Finding proof for something that will work in the future 
directly contradicts notions of empirical research, which requires observation and 
experience. Using the notion of evidence as proof when deciding on future policy is 
a true conversation stopper. Seeking evidence that can be used as proof for future 
success is not only a victory over windmills, but a confusing admission that windmills 
are in fact a real enemy.  
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We do see scope for evidence as proof when it comes to evaluating past policy; and 
this would be a useful way of reframing the task of a systematic evidence review. 
Empirical observation is possible on past policies; attempting to get as close as 
possible to the gold standard of proof might be useful in this context. However, when 
attempting to create proof it should be clear what particular information is proof of. 
Information can only be considered proof in an extremely limited context. Even in 
gold standard statistical research proof is only provided within a certain confidence 
interval. Observing a relationship between policy and outcome at the 5 % confidence 
level loosely means that there is a probability of 5 % that this relationship is due to 
chance. A randomised controlled trial can only provide proof applicable to the past 
policy studied, executed in the same way, at the same time and in the same place. It 
can only make a “it works somewhere” claim (Cartwright and Munro, 2010). 
Sometimes, the very way in which a policy is executed is affected by randomisation.  
Consider for example a study investigating whether election campaign messages 
based on clientelism or on national public goods are more effective in winning votes 
in Benin (Wantchekon, 2003). This involved convincing politicians to change their 
campaign messages in randomly chosen election districts to include exclusively 
clientelistic or public goods arguments. What is being studied here is the effect of 
enforcing particular campaign messages in random districts in a particular election 
circle in Benin. For this, the study provides evidence in the sense of proof.  What the 
study does not provide proof of is the impact of clientelism (as a strategy chosen by 
politicians based on whether they think it is likely to win them votes) on voting 
behaviour. Again, we do not mean that results of Wantchekon’s study are 
meaningless when attempting to answer the latter question, but at best, it can make 
the existence of such a relationship more plausible.    
3.2 The Realistic P: Plausibility 
Plausibility is an alternative way to navigate the translation process from systematic 
evidence reviewing to policy relevance of the information found. Plausibility allows 
for consideration of theory, or empirical studies that are of reasonably high quality 
yet fall short of the gold standard in evidence. Plausibility is not proof but is broader 
than most current definitions of evidence. A case that a policy can plausibly work 
may include retrospective proof from other contexts (proof that it was a right thing, 
done in a right way, at some other time and/or in some other place). But plausibility 
goes beyond this: it has to demonstrate that it is probable that the policy can work in 
another time and at another place. This is akin to what Cartwright terms a capacity 
claim: the claim that a treatment has a relatively stable capacity to provide a certain 
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outcome (Cartwright and Bradburn, 2011; Cartwright and Munro, 2010). Plausibility 
comes with a health warning: It still requires the huge effort involved in conducting a 
systematic evidence review, but in translating this to policy-relevant information it 
delivers no guarantees, no one-stop evidence shopping, no generalizations. It means 
more work on the horizon to continuously gather information to see if what seemed 
plausible at first really holds up–so the systematic evidence review is nothing but a 
snapshot in time. If policy-makers and practitioners spoke plausibility with each 
other when considering future policy, research could more credibly feed into 
programme planning, designing plausible Theories of Change, and allowing for 
context-specific programming. Any how-to guide on using evidence for policy and 
practice would be more convincing if it stressed the importance of plausibility; any 
systematic evidence review would be more complete if it synthesised from the 
perspective of plausibility. 
An obvious way to start building a plausibility case is to specify which activities the 
policy or intervention will entail, and what it intends to accomplish. To fully assess 
the intervention’s plausibility of success, more is required than a pairing of activities 
and outcomes. A good plausibility case includes all the steps that link the activity and 
the outcome to each other. These together form a theory of how the policy is 
supposed to work, factors that help and hinder the effectiveness of the policy and 
the interaction of the policy with other factors. This is central to establishing capacity 
(Cartwright and Bradburn, 2011; Cartwright and Munro, 2010). Systematic evidence 
reviewing may detract attention away from constructing such a theory, as it might 
misplace the focus. In the words of ODI:  
Outcomes are ultimately shaped by programme design and 
delivery, as well as by context […] and SRs [Systematic Reviews] 
do not necessarily help us understand these dimensions. In other 
words, the question of why things work is just as policy relevant 
as whether or not they do in the first place.(ODI Secure 
Livelihoods Research Consortium, 2012) 
Consider for example, a food for education programme (FEE). A plausibility case 
would state that giving households food in return for school enrolment increases 
educational attainment, and then it would detail exactly how this is expected to work. 
It would not only state that giving children meals at school can improve their 
learning, but painstakingly why that is the case. We may expect FEE programmes to 
improve children’s nutritional status, and better-fed children to have increased 
cognitive ability. Alternatively, poor households may not be able to invest as much in 
education as can be considered optimal in the long run given the returns to 
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education, and FEE programmes may raise the benefits to school enrolment, 
increasing enrolment and thereby educational attainment. However, this exercise may 
also bring to light mechanisms through which FEE programmes may decrease 
educational attainment: increased school enrolment may lead to overcrowded class-
rooms and decreased learning, or increased school enrolment may come at the cost 
of child labour, decreasing household income and thereby the nutritional status of 
children and their cognitive ability (Adelman et al., 2008).  
This is not a new suggestion; a number of donors now ask aspiring projects to 
formulate a Theory of Change, which includes such an elaborate description of the 
steps between activities and impact (Stein and Valters, 2012). Detailing these steps 
can help to find material when doing a systematic evidence review to build a case for 
or against plausibility. There may be very few studies done on the full intervention 
proposed. For example, Adelman et al. conclude that in 2008, gold standard studies 
into the impact of FEE programmes on educational outcomes were “relatively 
few”(Adelman et al., 2008). However, numerous studies may exist on the links in the 
chain connecting the intervention’s activities to an outcome. In our example, 
Adelman et al. mention: “nutrition literature offers many more experimental studies 
on nutrition outcomes than are yet available in the economics literature on education 
outcomes”(Adelman et al., 2008). Other helpful information in this case may be 
studies on the impact of nutritional status on cognitive abilities in other contexts, the 
actual and perceived returns to education in the region of intervention, or children’s 
nutritional status in this region. Developing a Theory of Change and investigating 
information which may or may not support each of the steps will not prove that the 
proposed policy will be successful. Yet finding information that supports at least 
some of the proposed mechanisms through which a policy is thought to work and 
that can reasonably be applied to the proposed context can help make the case that a 
particular policy could plausibly work. Alternatively it can decrease confidence that a 
particular policy is the right thing.  
The act of specifying the mechanisms through which an intervention is meant to 
work may preclude the need to build a full plausibility case. Even without reference 
to outside material, some interventions may not pass a test of basic logic. Take a 
project that proposes to educate women about their rights with the aim of decreasing 
domestic violence. Thinking this through, this project’s success depends on women 
being unaware of their right not to be subjected to violence in the home and lacking 
only this information to be able to change their situation. While this may be true in 
some cases, in many others, this may not be plausible from the outset. A framing 
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along the lines of plausibility will make these points a lot more obvious when 
reviewing the state of the evidence.  
A plausibility case can include information that falls short of gold standards outlined 
in the first section. When we recognise the limited use of proof, and consequently 
recognise that even gold standard information cannot prove future policy success, 
the rationale for favouring studies meeting the gold standard over all others becomes 
less obvious. Are we willing to admit that gold standard information may contribute 
to a plausibility case to a greater or lesser degree depending on how applicable it is to 
the time and place where a policy is proposed? If so, why would we automatically 
exclude from systematic reviews lower quality empirical studies in the same place, or 
theories that seem particularly appropriate to the context? In a plausibility case, this 
would not make sense; yet the practice of systematic evidence reviewing calls for 
such exclusion. 
Information that may contribute to building a plausibility case could come from 
studies investigating similar policies to the one proposed, but in another place and 
time. These may include studies on the intervention as a whole, or on particular 
mechanisms that are expected to make the intervention work. Insofar, a plausibility 
case and a systematic evidence review are not much different, although the emphasis 
on particular types of evidence in reviewing it might still exclude a lot of information. 
However, finding and quoting these studies is not sufficient–that provides neither 
proof nor plausibility, it just shows that someone has attended class but not done 
their homework. From basic logic, for studies from another context or another time 
period to feature in the plausibility case for a new policy, it is necessary to explicitly 
consider the ways in which the new context is similar or dissimilar to the past ones. 
What way of executing the intervention was successful in the past? Can this be 
replicated in the new context? What about the context was conducive to or hindered 
the past intervention’s success? Are similar favourable or unfavourable conditions 
found in the new context? 
This is a productive middle way between blueprinting interventions from one 
context to another without consideration, and completely dismissing proof from 
other contexts. It requires recognising that evidence is not about proof, but about 
making it probable that a particular action leads to an outcome. Cartwright calls this 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning and contrasts this with deductive reasoning 
(Cartwright, 2007). A single success of an intervention half-way around the world 
would contribute little to a plausibility case, whilst consistent studies indicating that 
the intervention is successful in a range of contexts, including some that can be 
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considered similar to the context proposed, should be a solid basis for plausibility. A 
range of studies that show that an intervention has been an abject failure does not 
prove that it cannot ever work anywhere, but does make it implausible that it will.  
Another source that falls short of evidence but that can be useful in building a 
plausibility case is empirical work that is of reasonable quality, but falls short of usual 
standards for evidence. Some evidence reviews for example (for example(Mansuri 
and Rao, 2003)) dismiss all studies that do not include a control and treatment group, 
and in which the intervention is not randomly administered. We see no reason why a 
gold standard RCT in a completely different context would automatically deliver 
plausibility, just as we see no reason that contains no RCT is automatically sent to the 
scrap heap.  The latter study may still contain information that renders the success of 
another intervention in the same context more or less plausible. This is especially 
relevant for interventions that are not easy to study, for example the many 
interventions that cannot ethically or operationally be randomized. 
   
3.3 The Adamant P: Principle 
One common theme in the evidence debate is the tension between pursuing genuine 
evidence-based policies and seeking out specific information to create policy-based 
evidence, evidence for policies that were already decided on for other reasons–a risk 
of which policymakers are well aware (House of Commons, 2006). These reasons 
could include ideological concerns or simply because policy makers get caught up in 
their own challenges when attempting to use empirical evidence to decide on polices. 
Vince Cable describes these challenges as having to grapple with the need for speed, 
superficiality, spin, secrecy and, from their own perspective, scientific ignorance with 
regard to methods and testability (ODI, 2009: 1-2). Phil Davies, former Deputy 
Director of the Government and Social Research Unit in the UK Cabinet Office, 
said that policy makers act on “their own values, experience, expertise and 
judgement; the influence of lobbyists and pressure groups; and pragmatism”, creating 
a situation in which “researchers and policy-makers have completely different 
concepts of what constitutes good evidence.”(ODI, 2009: 2) 
Thus we know that policies are not always based on evidence, and sometimes 
evidence is shaped around policies. However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
entire debate around evidence is disingenuous. Although the practice of policy-based 
evidence could be a sign of policy-makers’ distaste for engaging with evidence, it may 
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simply be a sign of an entirely different logic of decision making–one that can be 
identified as principle. 
It is important to recognize what proof and plausibility can and cannot do when 
searching out information through systematic evidence reviews. Proof is useful to 
evaluate whether a past policy has obtained its goals. Plausibility details whether it is 
likely that a proposed policy will obtain its goals. However, neither tells us whether 
these goals were worthwhile in the first place, or how different goals should be 
prioritized. To suggest that this could happen based on plausible research findings is 
naïve; basing a systematic evidence review on the premise of settling these priorities 
is a waste of time. Instead, principle recognizes the role of ideology in policy making: 
to choose a particular goal, or to prioritise one goal over another is a normative 
choice.  
Consider for example a systematic review of the evidence on the impact of 
corruption on economic growth, which was executed in 2011 and received funding 
from DfID (Ugur and Dasgupta, 2011). The question whether corruption is good, 
neutral or bad for economic growth is by no means invalid from a research point of 
view. The argument that corruption might be beneficial for growth by greasing the 
wheels for those engaging in high return activities, or by accumulating 
Schumpeterian rents that could spur innovation used to be very common, even 
dominant (Goldsmith, 2006). Whether and how the central research question of this 
systematic review can feed into the policy process is an entirely different matter. 
How would the policy process change, for example, if this systematic review 
concluded that corruption is beneficial for economic growth?2 Would DfID start to 
design policies stimulating corruption? Since corruption is widely perceived as unfair, 
dirty, or unprincipled, and as a reason to refrain from giving development aid, such a 
policy turn is highly unlikely.3 Alternatively, DfID might attach a lower priority to 
policies countering corruption. Still at the basis of such a decision would lay a 
principled, not evidence-based, argument that the goal of stimulating economic 
development has priority over fighting the unfairness of corruption. Given that 
choosing and prioritizing broad policy goals in this field is likely to be based on 
                                                 
2 Two out of 28 studies considered in Ugur and Dasgupta (2011) draw this conclusion 
3 See for example, the high profile 1.4 billion reasons campaign by the Global Poverty Project, which 
deals with corruption in some detail.  
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principle, systematic evidence reviewing is in this context not useful.4 It is more likely 
that the evidence review is used to justify policy decisions that have already been 
taken if conclusions are convenient (an example of policy-based evidence), and that 
the review is ignored otherwise.   
The example of food aid also illustrates how the emphasis on evidence-based policy 
can be unproductive when setting principled policy goals. There is a longstanding 
debate within the humanitarian and policy community on whether food aid is a 
disincentive for local food production, and thereby hampering long-term 
development (see for example (Abdulai et al., 2005)). Regardless of the outcome of 
the academic debate on this adverse effect, whether this is a sound reason to stop 
food aid–potentially condemning individuals to starvation–is a question of principle.  
We do not categorically say that setting broad policy goals using principle is a bad 
thing. A trade-off between corruption and growth, or relieving humanitarian need 
and long-term development, is of course driven by norms and beliefs. What indeed is 
a bad thing to do is to pretend that these principled decisions are informed by 
evidence that can be systematically sought out to make them seem more grounded, 
thus silencing those who disagree with the principle. The principle debate needs to be 
not on empirical evidence, but on what common ideologies can be used to design 
policies.  
 
The Visionary P: Possibility 
Something is still missing in the evidence picture we have presented up to this point. 
How can development policy innovate, move forward, and discover new ways to 
achieve policy goals that are deemed worthy? Principle might help us to have a more 
honest discussion of the goals behind policy. Proof and plausibility emphasize 
finding out what has worked somewhere, and what could plausibly work in the 
future. But potential for innovation is limited: principle, proof and plausibility can 
only teach us something about policies that have been tried before. They can help us 
                                                 
4 This is not to imply that the study by Ugur and Dasgupta is useless; it lists evidence for and against 
numerous mechanisms connecting corruption and growth, which could be extremely useful when 
building a plausibility case for a specific policy to counteract these mechanisms. The point here is that 
this would be a different stage of the policy process: when the broad goal of fighting corruption has 
been established, and specific policies are sought to attain this goal.  
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do less of the things that plausibly do not work, and more of the things that plausibly 
do work. But they cannot help us conceive of or risk something new.  
The notion of innovation seldom enters into the systematic review process because 
in this context, the definition of evidence is commonly restricted to empirical 
information. This implies that no evidence can exist on a policy that is newly 
conceived. Taking this notion to the extreme, requiring all policy to be evidence-
based by this definition means no new policy can ever be tried. There is little room 
to be unapologetically big and bold, new or experimental. The fourth P allows for 
such room: Possibility. 
We pose that there is really no need to use any empirical information to develop big 
perspectives about change. Such perspectives often emerge from seminal works. 
These can be big think pieces that have the power to change our understanding of 
development and they commonly do not achieve this with empirical evidence. 
Hence, they do not appear in evidence reviews. In fact, one of the major critiques 
directed at our evidence review was that we missed seminal works. Even though big 
ideas can suggest innovative policy, there is no obvious space for how this might 
happen in the current evidence landscape.  
How can systematic evidence reviewing be more friendly to innovation? By allowing 
ideas to stand as evidence. A first step is to not automatically exclude non-empirical 
work. In the first phase of selecting a pool of literature, systematic reviewers could 
include a selection of theoretical work or think pieces, selected on the basis of three 
criteria. First, the extent to which the work is recent, which could be easily 
determined through the publication date. Second, the degree to which the theory or 
idea is already covered by empirical work, which is presumably also found through 
the initial literature search. If this is the case, plausibility rather than possibility could 
take over. Third, the degree to which the work is well-respected, which can be 
roughly estimated by the ranking of the outlet it is published in, and/or the degree to 
which it is cited by others. In the second stage of the review, when the quality of 
empirical evidence is assessed, systematic reviewers could similarly assess theoretical 
work or think-pieces. They could evaluate whether the theory or idea presented is 
truly new, rather than a reformulation of already existing, empirically researched 
ideas. Furthermore, they could assess the quality of the theory or idea itself. A sound 
theory needs to be internally consistent (meaning it confirms to basic rules of logic 
and does not contradict itself), does not make unrealistic assumptions that drive the 
theory (meaning if these assumptions are changed, the predictions from the theory 
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change meaningfully) and makes a believable case that it explains some real-world 
phenomenon. 
Innovation can only happen if we accept that trying out new things comes with 
taking risks. Currently, development agencies are quite averse to programmatic risk, the 
risk that a programme does not achieve its objectives, or even causes harm. An 
OECD study of development programming in states affected by conflict finds for 
example: 
In many cases development agencies have avoided high risk programming 
choices required to support statebuilding, peacebuilding and other forms of 
transformational change, and have instead opted for safer programmes 
concerned with direct service delivery. [....] These tendencies limit agencies’ 
ability to address the challenges of statebuilding and peacebuilding.(OECD, 
2014: 25) 
Innovation can have a high return, but it is also risky. With Easterly, we argue for 
possibility within the evidence debate: for incremental change, for  experimenting 
with innovative policies, and for recognition that when trying ten of such policies, 
nine might be failures but this may be the price we have to pay to discover the tenth, 
high return policy (Easterly, 2002). 
Possibility as an approach changes the point of a systematic evidence review entirely: 
rather than seeking out empirical evidence, it moves the notion of evidence review 
towards a review of ideas and methods of investigation. What can then be presented 
is more akin to a narrative synthesis through an account of discourse and reflection, 
rather than through the pursuit of statistical and systematic analysis of existing 
information.  
Possibility, our fourth perspective on evidence, is necessary to recognise emerging 
ideas and ways of seeing the world. To have exploration of new possibilities through 
fresh perspectives crowded out by an evidence debate with a narrow technical focus 
means to lose the motivation for searching for evidence in the first place: To join a 
quest for a better understanding of the world, the people in it, and what they 
collectively might be able to achieve. 
4 Conclusion 
We started off, somewhat grudgingly, by fulfilling a requirement to deliver a range of 
systematic evidence reviews to our donor. Soon we got hooked on thinking about 
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what was right or wrong about them–how difficult it was to be systematic, how the 
focus on specific types of information may decrease the space for innovation, ignore 
seminal ideas and privilege out-of-context but gold standard empirical information 
over context-specific information of lower quality or theory.  
Even more interesting was when we started to notice how some of these experiences 
linked to the much bigger debate about how to translate the findings or omissions of 
systematic reviews to usable information for development policy. No matter how 
much systematic reviewing on individual research one does, it does not automatically 
lead to finding out what the evidence landscape looks like. Even less obvious was 
how systematic evidence reviews might helpfully inform policy–after all the process 
of policy making is in itself not that clear, having been described by Clay and 
Schaeffer as “a chaos of purposes and accidents”, or as “‘complex’ (Ramalingam et 
al., 2008), ‘multifactoral’ and ‘non-linear’.(ODI, 2009: 1) 
There is much talk of a gold standard of evidence, but what to do with such precious 
metal remains rather unexplored. Thus we propose to abandon the notion that the 
purpose of systematic evidence reviews is to determine quality of evidence. Rather, 
we put an ornate frame around different ways of seeing usability of evidence, which 
we call the ‘Four P’s’. Each of these P’s represents a perspective on evidence that is 
useful in different stages or for different purposes of the policy process; none of 
these are usefully left out of systematic evidence reviews. Principle may be invoked 
when broad policy goals are set, a process that more often than not involves 
normative choices. A transparent discussion about which principles have a broad 
base of support is more productive than searching for fig leaves of evidence to justify 
predetermined policy in the eyes of those not subscribing to the principle underlying 
it. Plausibility comes in when considering alternative policies to attain broad policy 
goals, and we suspect this would be the perspective used most often. Recognition 
that even gold standard information does not guarantee future policy success allows 
us to include information commonly not considered evidence, such as lower quality 
studies or theory, to play a role in the policy process. Use of evidence as proof is 
relatively limited, although one can strive for the standard of proof when doing an 
evaluation. Finally, possibility brings innovation and experimentation back in, and in 
the process makes the job of conducting a systematic evidence review much bigger.  
When systematically reviewing evidence, thinking of proof, plausibility, principle and 
possibility–rather than wanting to examine the quality of evidence–requires constant 
questioning of one’s own perspectives on evidence. In translating evidence to policy 
relevant information, it means searching for the right perspective, redefining success 
24 
 
and failure, and adjusting Theories of Change based on newly understood 
plausibility, which could possibly change perspectives entirely. This may be 
frustrating, it may be repetitive, it may not be streamlined, and it is unlikely to be 
efficient. It might feel more like aluminium than gold; it most likely will not feel as 
clean as the endeavour of a systematic evidence review suggests. Yet it is a way to 
constructively manage the encounters between solid social science and unpredictable 
and messy humans–whether these are researchers, policymakers, and practitioners, or 
those at the receiving of international development policies. Such less exclusionary 
approach is necessary to at least make it possible that international development 
policies is made in the best informed way possible.  
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